Recon Report
anva.ch
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
5 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
68/100
ACC:57%
CUR:81
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE could not be verified — TLSA lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 6698)
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
3 nameservers detected
ns.second-ns.com
ns1.your-server.de
ns3.second-ns.de
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:21:07Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:13ft.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:08:15Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:ai.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:22:44Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:atuin.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-04-04T06:26:28Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:auth.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mail.anva.ch first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autoconfig.anva.ch source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mail.anva.ch first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autodiscover.anva.ch source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:31:36Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:book.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-04-11T01:57:17Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:br.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-04-08T09:31:24Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cc.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:conference.xmpp.anva.ch source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:41:29Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cyberchef.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:42:45Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:feedback.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:firewall.anva.ch source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:44:02Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:home.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-30T18:45:34Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:immich.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-04-08T07:31:24Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:l.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-04-09T14:27:52Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:ldap.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-04-28T11:51:31Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:mail.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-04-08T04:31:25Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:media.anva.ch source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:mail.anva.ch first_seen:2026-04-24T18:07:55Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:mta-sts.anva.ch source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
34d8753f6464149c2cc2fd066c87eabbde81349dd903e5e4be958f295abe3dee5532a2a22b83e630ddda89ed097d8e6a0bba498565cd1fcdf0121ae3cc27f6a4
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-245-g1ffeb4516
Posture Hash
9a3cb807fcb25b42…