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Recon Report

managed-it-service.org
1 Jul 2026, 21:02 UTC · 65.2s ·v26.50.05-245-g1ffeb4516
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
2 defensive layers | 7 attack surface gaps
2 weaknesses 1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 65/100
ACC:63% CUR:67 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partially DMARC present but no SPF
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE could not be verified — TLSA lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 6698)
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
docks15.rzone.de shades06.rzone.de
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:— cname_target:autoconfigure.strato.de first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autoconfig.managed-it-service.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— cname_target:managed-it-service.org first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.managed-it-service.org services:[map[http_title:click4business is under construction port:80 product:F5 BIG-IP load balancer http proxy protocol:tcp service:http-proxy] map[http_title:400 Bad Request port:443 product:Apache/2.4.68 (Unix) protocol:tcp service:https]] source:dns]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
418f1c832ea7b84cc164333c3200b66f2fcf498aaae5a526eaef05a780ac2ea056a57ea35a13fcd1df55499b95616050a0fdfc910876555f3c563859d5b2d175
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-245-g1ffeb4516
Posture Hash
7027b693f44b593a…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding