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Recon Report

microsoft.com

21 Apr 2026, 21:28 UTC · 25.4s ·v26.47.02

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Hardened

6 defensive layers | 2 attack surface gaps

ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 70/100

ACC:60% CUR:82 MAT:consistent

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded

MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS

TLS-RPT

TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI

No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

4 nameservers detected

ns1-39.azure-dns.com ns2-39.azure-dns.net ns3-39.azure-dns.org ns4-39.azure-dns.info

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T17:16:14Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:001-inso.apac.prd.api.cos.mediapaas.infra.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T09:12:05Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:002-ussc.noam.prd.ivr.cos.mediapaas.infra.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T19:23:10Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:003-usea.noam.prd.api.cos.mediapaas.infra.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T19:25:23Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:004-usea.noam.prd.api.cos.mediapaas.infra.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T17:22:31Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:012-frce.emea.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T16:58:37Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:016-ussc.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T13:56:46Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:017-uswe.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T05:30:02Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:018-uswe.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T01:06:18Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:019-usea.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T09:01:29Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:020-usea.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-27T23:11:41Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:020-ussc.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T09:14:12Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:021-swce.emea.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T18:40:42Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:021-ussc.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 cname_target:ic3-media-audiencebot.noam-uswe-021.ic3-media-audiencebot.westus-prod.cosmic.office.net first_seen:2025-04-28T07:26:18Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:021-uswe.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T10:39:44Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:022-usea.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T18:23:16Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:022-uswe.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T01:21:45Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:023-frce.emea.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T19:42:40Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:023-usea.noam.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T09:59:04Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:024-frce.emea.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-28T14:47:52Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:025-frce.emea.prod.cos.audience.teams.microsoft.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

8 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

1Password Microsoft 365 Atlassian DocuSign Facebook / Meta Google Workspace HubSpot Linear

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

8e2c48d8606d486493f41f94f3724738872a39ba9860dbf337f3f04305b91e370b4cf29f86fa6cac4900e805cbf5b4a1997dbf40beb239a30877f3c216fcef32

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.47.02

Posture Hash

7f3244c80f121d5e…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do