Skip to main content

Recon Report

maulhardt.info
20 Apr 2026, 04:17 UTC · 61.1s ·v26.46.24
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
2 defensive layers | 7 attack surface gaps
2 weaknesses 2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE HIGH 76/100
ACC:68% CUR:85 MAT:consistent
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
No DMARC — domain has zero email authentication enforcement
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
3 nameservers detected
ns.second-ns.com ns1.your-server.de ns3.second-ns.de
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mail.your-server.de first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autoconfig.maulhardt.info source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.maulhardt.info source:dns]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
94d081d1410dd04c87baa7b2b050fcc1cfeed0ef7d71a0fd80ba2ad4921cfff632a36ddd4825c9fa1339971e9136d04fb696e9fdba7b378bfc10faa27ae6dc60
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.46.24
Posture Hash
e55148adf2eaed30…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding