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Recon Report

cloudflare.com

19 Apr 2026, 13:14 UTC · 8.9s ·v26.46.21

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Hardened

7 defensive layers | 2 attack surface gaps

ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 63/100

ACC:56% CUR:71 MAT:consistent

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain

MTA-STS

MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible

TLS-RPT

No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed

BIMI

BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.

0 issue "comodoca.com"

0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"

0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"

0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

0 issuewild "comodoca.com"

0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"

0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"

0 issue "ssl.com"

0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"

0 issuewild "ssl.com"

0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

5 nameservers detected

ns3.cloudflare.com ns4.cloudflare.com ns5.cloudflare.com ns6.cloudflare.com ns7.cloudflare.com

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-04T03:32:50 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:a-staging.nel.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-02-10T19:59:42 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:a.href.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-20T23:49:53 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:a.nel.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:17 first_seen:2026-02-23T10:27:47 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Google Trust Services] name:abuse.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-02-18T18:14:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:access-trail.research.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:16 first_seen:2026-03-08T10:26:51 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Google Trust Services] name:access.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-28T21:25:42 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:accounts-devel.realtime.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-20T07:44:07 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:accounts-test.staging.realtime.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-01-28T22:39:48 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:accounts.realtime.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:6 first_seen:2026-03-04T09:43:02 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:accounts.staging.realtime.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-28T21:44:07 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:accounts2.realtime.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-04T07:32:09 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:act-issuer.research.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-04T07:43:21 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:act-origin.research.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-02-01T15:30:55 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:admin-staging.registrar.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-01-27T14:12:31 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:admin.certifications.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-03-02T09:05:27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:admin.notifications.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-02-01T15:46:43 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:admin.registrar.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:18 first_seen:2026-02-17T03:29:22 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Google Trust Services] name:admin.sqlite.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-01-31T22:09:33 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:advertisements.indexer-staging.ipfs.cloudflare.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-02-01T02:23:15 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:advertisements.indexer.ipfs.cloudflare.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

9 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Microsoft 365 Apple Atlassian Canva Cisco Umbrella Facebook / Meta Google Workspace Miro Stripe

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

c03d919ba2106bdf0919db2a0cde5d600c8dc42aa29ebf465c5fa85ffe0cec4f52d44da14f1155bdc19c97c121ea0df9ea1ab1e5e6488802481509e6dfdc0c61

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.46.21

Posture Hash

07ab689fde8128ad…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do