Recon Report
google.com
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
6 defensive layers
|
2 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification — brand faking via other vectors remains possible
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "pki.goog"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
DNS Provider
Google Cloud DNS
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-01-16T10:58:02 is_current:false issuers:[StartCom Ltd.] name:aarjav-b480g7k2ab9@checkout.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:www3.l.google.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:account.google.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:20 first_seen:2014-04-09T11:49:31 is_current:false issuers:[Google Inc] name:accounts.flexpack.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:48 first_seen:2012-11-21T10:09:59 is_current:false issuers:[Google Inc] name:accounts.freezone.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:48 first_seen:2011-07-13T05:53:53 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc Thawte Consulting (Pty) Ltd.] name:accounts.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:admin.google.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2011-11-23T04:00:49 is_current:false issuers:[Google Inc] name:ads-compare.eem.corp.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:75 first_seen:2011-05-11T06:40:19 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc Equifax] name:adwords.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:www3.l.google.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alerts.google.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt1.aspmx.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt1.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt1.gmr-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt2.aspmx.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt2.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt2.gmr-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt3.aspmx.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt3.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt3.gmr-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt4.aspmx.l.google.com source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2013-07-11T21:21:10 is_current:true issuers:[Google Inc] name:alt4.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
6 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Cisco Umbrella
Facebook
Google
Apple
DocuSign
Microsoft
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
6c02cd54d2cde9c765b51659cd7217b4b56cbb87ae35858d0e7ed1f5d916d6bb03ac4d42e1aec532b346a658c159d6bb3461839bb9a4ef4f3fd24fd12eb606a5
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.19.18
Posture Hash
c97bee54361ee458…